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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jordan D. Everhart appeals from his Judgment of Conviction and Commitment
for first degree murder. Mr. Everhart asserts that the district court erred in admitting
audio exhibits and the corresponding transcripts of certain phone calls made by him
while in custody. He asserts that the phone calls, or portions thereof, were not relevant.
Alternatively, Mr. Everhart asserts that this evidence's prejudicial effect outweighed its
probative value.

Additionally, Mr. Everhart asserts that the district court abused its

discretion in imposing an excessive sentence and in denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On the evening of October 7, 2011, Mr. Everhart was taking care of his
girlfriend's two young children while his girlfriend was at work. (Tr. Vol.II., p.600, Ls.1021.) At 2:35 a.m., Mr. Everhart called the police because one of the children, 18-monthold A.C., was unresponsive.

(Tr. Vol.I., p.606, Ls.2-19; Tr. Vol.II., p.618, Ls.2-19 -

p.619, Ls.1-20.) Mr. Everhart testified at trial that he was playing with A.G. by tossing
her in the air and that she slipped from his hands and hit her head on the dryer.
(Tr. Vol. 11., p.617, Ls.3-23.) He also admitted to striking her on her feet with a belt
because she would not stay in bed. (Tr. Vol.II., p.614, Ls.4-20.) A.G. was taken to the
hospital and was removed from life support a week later. (Tr. Vol.I., p.1233, Ls.2-17.)
Numerous doctors and medical personnel testified that A.G. died from a traumatic brain
injury and that A.G. had other recent bruising on her feet and under her arms. (See

1

generally, Tr.) Mr. Everhart was charged with first degree murder by aggravated battery
of

child. (R., pp.61

) He pleaded not guilty. (Tr. Vol.I., p.1, Ls.13-14.)

The State filed State's Motion in Limine Five

Admission of Certain Audio

Recorded Calls from the Ada County Jail, noting that it desired a pre-trial ruling on the
admissibility of portions of recorded jail calls between the defendant and several
individuals.

(Sealed R., pp.30-31.) 1

Mr. Everhart filed a Defendant's Response to

State's Motion in Limine Five and asserted "that the proffered statements are irrelevant
and do not show a consciousness of guilt." (R., pp.247-248.)

Following several

hearings on the motion, the district court ruled that redacted versions of most of the
offered phone calls were admissible. (Tr. Vol. I., p.536, L.14 - p.544, L.11.)
A jury trial began on October 19, 2012. (Tr. Vol.I., p.41, Ls.5-9.) After several
weeks of testimony, on November 13, 2012, a jury found Mr. Everhart guilty on the sole
charge of murder in the first degree. (R., p.358.) At the sentencing hearing, the court
reviewed, among other things, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), a mental
health evaluation from Dr. Craig Beaver, numerous letters of support from family
members and non-family members, school and medical records, photographs, and a
video recording. (Tr. Vol.II., pp.1080-1083.) The court also heard testimony from A.C.'s
great aunt, three police officers who discussed gang affiliations, Dr. Beaver, and
Mr. Everhart's mother. (Tr. Vol.II., pp.1085-1178.)
The State recommended a fixed sentence of 30 years, with life indeterminate.
(Tr. Vol.II., p.1179, Ls.11-14.) Defense counsel recommended a fixed sentence of 10
years. (Tr. Vol.II., p.1202, Ls.23-25.) The court imposed a fixed sentence of 20 years,

1

For ease of reference, the electronic file EverhartSEAL, which contains the
confidential record, will be cited as "Sealed R."

2

with life indeterminate.

(R., pp.378-381.)

The court stated that it placed very little

weight on Mr. Everhart's criminal history because it occurred when Mr. Everhart was a
juvenile and because very few charges resulted in criminal convictions.
p.1215, Ls.18-25.)

(Tr. Vol.II.,

The court further stated that it placed even less weight on the

testimony regarding potential gang association because it was not related to what
happened to A.G..

(Tr. Vol.II., p.1218, Ls.3-9.) The court commented that, although

Dr. Beaver concluded that Mr. Everhart was a low risk to reoffend, the court felt that
because the current offense happened, Mr. Everhart was a higher risk to society.
(Tr. Vol.II., p.1219, Ls.1-19.)
Mr. Everhart filed a Notice of Appeal on June 28, 2013. (R., pp.383-387.) On
September 6, 2014, Mr. Everhart filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence, followed by
a Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence.
(R., pp.391-402.)

The

district

court

denied

Mr.

Everhart's

Rule

35

motion.

(Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Rule 35 Motion). 2

A Motion to Augment the Record to include the district court's Memorandum Decision
and Order Re: Defendant's Rule 35 Motion has been filed contemporaneously with this
brief.
2
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in admitting State's Exhibits 53, 53-A, 55, and 55-A,
audio and the corresponding transcripts of two jail phone calls placed by
Mr. Everhart, as the exhibits, or portions thereof, were not relevant and were
overly prejudicial?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Everhart a
sentence that is excessive given any view of the facts?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Everhart's Rule 35
Motion?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Admitting State's Exhibits 53, 53-A, 55, And 55-A, Audio And
The Corresponding Transcripts Of Two Jail Phone Calls Placed By Mr. Everhart, As
The Exhibits, Or Portions Thereof, Were Not Relevant And Were Overly Preiudicial
A.

Introduction
Mr. Everhart asserts that it was error for the district court to allow the admission

of State's Exhibits 53, 53-A, 55, and 55-A, audio and the corresponding transcripts of
two jail phone calls.

He asserts that these exhibits, or portions thereof, were not

relevant. Additionally, he asserts that the exhibits' probative value is outweighed by the
prejudicial effect.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that is freely reviewed. State v.

Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008).

When reviewing the determination that the

probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of
discretion standard is applied. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993).

C.

The District Court Erred In Admitting State's Exhibits 53, 53-A 55, And 55-A,
Audio And The Corresponding Transcripts Of Two Jail Phone Calls Placed By
Mr. Everhart, As The Exhibits, Or Portions Thereof, Were Not Relevant And
Were Overly Prejudicial
The State filed State's Motion in Limine Five - Admission of Certain Audio

Recorded Calls from the Ada County Jail, noting that it desired a pre-trial ruling on the
admissibility of "portions of recorded jail calls between the defendant and his family
wherein they discussed his communications with his attorney, whether he told his
attorney 'too much' about what happened the night [A.C.] was fatally injured and
discussed that, no matter what he may have already said to the attorney, to 'stick to the
5

script' and stick to his story - he didn't do anything." (Sealed R., pp.30-31.) The
asserted that the jail calls were relevant evidence of Mr. Everhart's "consciousness of
guilt and false prior statements to medial/law enforcement about what happened to
[A.C.]."

(Sealed R., p.31.)

The State also asserted that the probative value was

outweighed by any unfair prejudice. (Sealed R., p.31.) The State filed a brief in support
of the motion furthering its augments in support of admission. (Sealed R., pp.136-161.)
The State attached unredacted copies of several of the phone calls to the motion.
(Sealed R., pp.163-183, marked as State's Exhibits 1 -4.)
The October 11, 2011, at 21:31 3 , phone call is a phone call between
Mr. Everhart, his step-father and brother. (Sealed R., pp.169-173

State's Exhibit 2.)

During the phone call, Mr. Everhart discusses that he talked to his attorney, the family
asks if he told the attorney that he did not commit the charged crime, and Mr. Everhart
responds affirmatively. (Sealed R., pp.169-173- State's Exhibit 2.)
The October 11, 2011, at 22:304, phone call is between Mr. Everhart and his
mother.

(Sealed R., pp.175-177 -

State's Exhibit 3.)

During the phone call,

Mr. Everhart states that he may have told his attorney too much information. (Sealed
R., p.176-State's Exhibit 3.)
The October 12, 2011, at 16:31 5 , phone call involves a discussion between
Mr. Everhart and his family. (Sealed R., pp.179-182 - State's Exhibit 4.) Mr. Everhart
does very little talking, mostly just responding "yeah" to things his family members say,

Portions of the October 11, 2011, at 21 :31, phone
State's Exhibit 53 and the transcript of the audio was
istate's Exhibits 53 and 53-A.)
This phone call was not admitted at trial.
5 Portions of the October 12, 2011, at 16:31, phone
State's Exhibit 55 and the transcript of the audio was
(State's Exhibits 55 and 55-A.)
3

6

call are later admitted at trial as
admitted as State's Exhibit 53-A.

call are later admitted at trial as
admitted as State's Exhibit 55-A.

including statements encouraging him to not admit anything and to "stick to the script."
(Sealed R., pp.179-182 - State's Exhibit 4.)
Mr. Everhart filed a Defendant's Response to State's Motion in Limine Five and
asserted that the conversations between his family and himself did not waive his
attorney-client privilege, "that the proffered statements are irrelevant and do not show a
consciousness of guilt," and the statements "leave too much inference for the jury to
decide." (R., pp.247-248.)
In a later filing, Mr. Everhart supplemented his arguments about the jail calls with
assertions that playing portions of the phone calls may implicate his Fifth Amendment
rights. (R., pp.258-263.) This Addendum to Defendant's Response to State's Motion in
Limine Five, also articulated specific sections to which Mr. Everhart was objecting upon
relevancy grounds: For the October 11, 2011, at 21 :31, phone call, he asserted that
"page 2, line 14 to page 3, line 17, may be marginally relevant; page 9, line 5, through
page 10, line 15 appears to be relevant. However the remainder of this phone call is
irrelevant to any issue at hand." (R., p.262.) For the October 11, 2011, at 22:30, phone
call, he asserted the entire phone call was irrelevant, and that any probative value was
far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (R., p.262.) And, for the October 12,
2011, at 16:31, phone call, he asserted the entire phone call was irrelevant. (R., p.262.)
The State filed a response discussing that there was no State action implicating
Mr. Everhart's Fifth Amendment rights, that admission of the phone calls would not
implicate his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and specifically addressed phone
calls which are not the subject of this appeal. (R., pp.267-276.)
Following several hearing on the motion, the district court ruled that the
October 11, 2011, at 22:30, phone call was inadmissible and that redacted versions of
7

the October 11, 2011, at 21:31, and the October 12, 2011, at 16:31, would be
admissible. (Tr. Vol. I., p.540, L.9

p.542, L.13.)

On appeal, Mr. Everhart asserts that the following portion of the October 1, 2011,
at 21 :31, State's Exhibit 53, was improperly admitted:
FATHER:

You didn't tell him that you did it or anything like that, right?

J. EVERHART:

Yeah.

FATHER:

It's okay though, you know. Hey, you know, as long as you
know we still, you know - you know, sticking to your story,
man, you know, you didn't do it, you know, and we're
standing by you 100 percent.

J. EVERHART:

I know.

(State's Exhibit 53, State's Exhibit 53-A, p.3, Ls.5-12.)
Mr. Everhart asserts that the entirety of State's Exhibits 55 and 55-A should not
have been admitted. Specifically, he asserts that the following excerpt was improperly
admitted and that if this portion was not admitted, that the remainder of the call, noting
that it was a collect call and the salutations of Mr. Everhart's mother, would no longer be
necessary:
MOTHER:

So you don't have to go admitting to anything like that. You
just didn't do it and you don't know what happened.

J. EVERHART:

Yeah.

MOTHER:

You know what I mean?

FATHER:

Jordan, is that what you basically told the lawyer that you
didn't do anything, right?

J. EVERHART:

(Inaudible.)

FATHER:

Huh?

J. EVERHART:

Yeah.

FATHER:

Okay.
8

MOTHER:

And

FATH

So stick to the script, okay? Jordan, let me just tell you this.
We as a family, we know you didn't do this, okay? And so we
just have and you don't have to prove that you didn't do it,
Jordan. They have to prove that you done it.

J. EVERHART:

Yeah.

(State's Exhibit 55, State's Exhibit 55-A, p.2, L.10 - p.3, L.2.)

1.

The Exhibits Were Not Relevant

"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. I.R.

401. Relevant

evidence is admissible unless otherwise prohibited by the Rules of Evidence, while
evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. I.RE. 402.
Mr. Everhart asserts that State's Exhibits 53, 55 and the corresponding
transcripts are not relevant.

Both excerpts do not contain any statements showing a

consciousness of guilt, contrary to the State's assertion. Instead, in both phone calls,
Mr. Everhart only acknowledges the statements by his family that he should not admit to
anything and "stick to the script" by saying "I know" or "yeah." These excerpts do not
show that he was changing his story about the events of the evening when AC. was
injured, that he was covering up his actions, or lead to an inference that he was actually
guilty.
In fact, the State previously conceded that the contents of State's Exhibit 55 were
not actually relevant. At the October 22, 2012, hearing, the State conceded that if the
October 11, 2011, at 22:30, phone call to Mr. Everhart's mother where he states that he

9

may have told the attorney too much was not admitted, than the phone call on
October 1

2011, was not relevant:

MS. LONGHURST: Judge, I agree that the call on the 1ih is kind of
dependant in its relevance to the call to his mother, "I told him too much."
If that call doesn't come in, I don't see that the 1ih is relevant.
(Tr. Vol. I., p.517, L.24- p.518, L.2.) Mr. Everhart asserts that the challenged portion of
State's Exhibit 53 is strikingly similar to State's Exhibit 55 and, therefore, should also be
deemed irrelevant.
The excerpts from State's Exhibit's 53 and 55 do not have the "tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Therefore, it was error
for the district court to admit the evidence as it was not relevant.

2.

The Probative Value Is Outweighed By The Prejudicial Effect

I.R.E. 403 states that "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... " I.R.E.
403.

As noted above, the evidence has no probative value and is not relevant.

Assuming arguendo that this Court finds the evidence was relevant, there is a danger of
prejudice to Mr. Everhart. 6

Mr. Everhart notes that there was no specific objection by defense counsel to the
prejudicial nature of State's Exhibits 53, 53-A, 55, or 55-A. However, he asserts that the
balancing test was put at issue by the State specifically in its initial motion. (Sealed
R, pp.30-31.) And, several times during the October 22, 2012, hearing, the district
court discussed the balancing test required by Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. (See
generally Tr. Vol. I., p.487, L.15 - p.531, L.16.) As such, the district court clearly
recognized its duty to conduct a balancing test under I.RE. 403. Although the district
court did not specifically mention I.RE. 403 or prejudice in ruling on the admissibility of
the challenged portions of the phone calls, Mr. Everhart asserts that the required
balancing test was implicit in the admissibility ruling as evidenced by the district court's
repeated mentioning of the balancing test when ruling that some portions of the phone
calls were inadmissible.
6
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Mr. Everhart asserts that the challenged portions of State's exhibits 53, 53-A, 55
and 55-A were highly prejudicial and as such, any limited probative value was
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. At the October 22, 2012 hearing, while
discussing an earlier phone call where Mr. Everhart's step-father and brother discuss
that an attorney has been hired and what Mr. Everhart should talk to his attorney about,
the district court noted that "the probative value by those sorts of statements by persons
other than Mr. Everhart explaining things to him would be substantially outweighed by
the dangers addressed in Rule of Evidence 403."

(Tr. Vol. I., p.502, Ls.1-8.)

Mr. Everhart asserts that the same logic applies to the challenged portions of the
exhibits.

These excerpts contain only statements by Mr. Everhart's family and mere

acknowledgement of those statements by Mr. Everhart. Therefore, the probative value
is significantly limited and the dangers of prejudice require that the challenged portions
be excluded.
Further, one interpretation of the statements by Mr. Everhart's family is merely
that they believed that he was innocent and wanted him to keep up the fight. However,
another interpretation is that Mr. Everhart's family are repeatedly telling him to say
nothing and "stick to the script" because they are concerned about his potential
involvement or, worse, believe he is guilty and that keeping quite will deprive the State
of the evidence it may otherwise obtain to prove this fact. The State encouraged the
jury to find the later interpretation by highlighting the "stick to the script" comments in
closing arguments. (Tr. Vol.II., p.721, L.15 - p.733, L.17, p.818, Ls.7-23.)
Certainly, evidence that Mr. Everhart's closest family members were questioning
his involvement in the tragic death of AC. is something that would be considered by the
jury. This is especially relevant because Mr. Everhart admitted causing the fatal injury,
11

but testified that it was an accident. As such, the entire case boiled down to a credibility
determination and the jury was left to decide if the injury was an accident. In making
this determination, the jury not only considered Mr. Everhart's testimony and demeanor,
but likely considered evidence regarding whether or not his family believed and
supported him.

Therefore, because of the competing interpretations and the danger

that the jury would accept the more nefarious interpretation, the danger of unfair
prejudice outweighs any potential probative value.
As such, Mr. Everhart asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the challenged portions of the exhibits.

3.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That Admittance Of The Evidence
Was Harmless Error

The harmless error doctrine has been defined by this Court: 'To hold an error as
harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous
objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden
of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 227 (2010). The State will simply be unable to prove that the admission of
the challenged portions of State's Exhibits 53, 53-A, 55 and 55-A is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Mr. Everhart notes that the harm from the admission was not limited to just the
jury hearing and reading along with the exhibits, but that the harm was amplified by the
12

State's mention of these exhibits in closing arguments.

The prosecution highlighted

Mr. Everhart's father's statements to him regarding sticking to the script in closing:
Remember -- this is State's 53. Remember those conversations
that you heard early on, those reported monitored phone calls? And this
is a phone call with the defendant's stepfather and they were talking about
different things.
Remember how he told him, Stick to your story. Right? Tell them
you didn't do it. Stick to your story. Told him in State's 53 - or 55, excuse
me - remember to stick to the script.
And Jordan said, Yeah, I know, I know.
(Tr. Vol.II., p.721, Ls.15-24.) The prosecutor then discussed the different "scripts" the
Mr. Everhart allegedly presented over the next twelve pages of closing arguments.
(Tr. Vol.II., p.721, L.25 - p.733, L.17.) Again, the "scripts" were mentioned in rebuttal
closing:
Script No. 12 doesn't explain it any better than the rest of those
stories .... Jordan Everhart has given us 12 scripts. The scripts when his
father tells him - his stepfather tells him to stick to the script, that would
have been sound advice if it weren't for the fact that each and every script
is fiction.
(Tr. Vol.II., p.818, Ls.7-23.)
As such, the State will simply be unable to demonstrate that the admission of the
challenged portions of the exhibits is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Everhart A
Sentence That Is Excessive Given Any View Of The Facts
Mr. Everhart is described by those who know him as a soft-spoken, gentle, and
trustworthy young man. Based on the facts of this case, Mr. Everhart's unified sentence
of twenty years fixed, and life indeterminate, is excessive because it is not necessary to
achieve the goals of sentencing.

When there is a claim that the sentencing court
13

imposed an

sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent

examination of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke,
103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). Here, there are several mitigating factors that indicate
that Mr. Everhart's character and other mitigating evidence was not adequately
considered by the district court.
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of
discretion standard.

State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). When a

sentence is unreasonable based on the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion.
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982).

Unless it appears that confinement was

necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given
case," a sentence is unreasonable.

State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App.

1982).
Mr. Everhart is a 23-year-old young man who has suffered greatly in his life.
When he was 18 years old, Mr. Everhart ran into a burning house to try to rescue his
best friend. (Tr. Vol.II., p.1198, Ls.13-16.) The friend died in this fire and Mr. Everhart
was severely burned on over 50 percent of his body.

(Tr. Vol.II., p.1145, Ls.23-25.)

The doctors believed his chance of survival was less than five percent. (PSI, p.276.)7
He survived through ten months of painful skin grafting, and two of his toes and one of
his fingers were amputated.
outpouring

of family and

(Tr. Vol.II., p.1198, Ls.2-8; PSI, pp.583, 590.)
community

support during

his

The

recovery speaks to

For ease of reference, PSI citations correspond to the electronic PDF file
"EverhartPSI." This document includes the PSI and attached documents including
police reports, letters, psychological evaluations, etc.
7

14

Mr. Everhart's character and likability.

(PSI, pp.254-311.)

Mr. Everhart mostly

recovered from his injuries, but still bears physical and emotional scars.

The Idaho

Court of Appeals has held that "rehabilitation and health problems are factors to
consider in a motion for reduction in a sentence." State v. James, 112 Idaho 239, 24344 (Ct. App. 1986).
Mr. Everhart was a kind child who tried to make other people laugh.

Despite

growing up in a gang-ridden neighborhood in Yakima, Washington, Mr. Everhart
preferred to spend his time at the community center. (Tr. Vol.II., p.1197, Ls.9-14.) At
sentencing, the State tried without success to paint Mr. Everhart as a gang member with
criminal inclinations. Mr. Everhart has not been previously convicted of a felony. (PSI,
pp.4-5.) Although he has a minimal criminal record, the charges all result from his
actions as a juvenile. (PSI, pp.4-5.)

The court rejected the State's argument that

Mr. Everhart's criminal history was significant, since the conduct occurred when
Mr. Everhart was a juvenile and most charges did not result in criminal convictions.
(Tr. Vol.II., p.1215, Ls.18-25.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first
offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." State v.

Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Further, the State's claims about Mr. Everhart's
gang associations are weak, at best, and the court found that any such association was
unrelated to the current offense. (Tr. Vol.II., p.1218, Ls.3-24.)
Mr. Everhart was only 21 years old when A.C. died. (Tr. Vol.II., p.1213, Ls.1217.) Idaho courts have previously recognized that in modifying sentences, the Court
"has given great weight to the age of a defendant." State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,
15

144 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)).
Mr. Everhart was the primary caretaker of AC. while her mother worked and went to
school (Tr. Vol.I., p.1202, L.10
intellectually unprepared for.

p.1204, L.20), something he was emotionally and
Mr. Everhart has a history of special education and

cognitive limitations. (PSI, p.582.) Dr. Beaver determined that Mr. Everhart was in the
low-average range of intellectual skills and abilities. (PSI, p.590). His IQ is 85. (PSI,
p.590.) His verbal comprehension is in the 3yth percentile, his perceptual reasoning is
in the 34 th percentile, his working memory is in the 9 th percentile, and his processing
speed is in the 8 th percentile.

(PSI, p.590.)

Dr. Beaver explained that Mr. Everhart

struggled with simple arithmetic and showed significant academic deficiencies despite
his average intellectual ability.

(PSI, p.590.)

However, even with his developmental

difficulties, Dr. Beaver recorded no major psychiatric difficulties, a factor that supports
rehabilitation. (PSI, p.592.) Further, Dr. Beaver concluded that Mr. Everhart's attitude
toward others is warm and friendly, and that he shies away from conflict. (PSI, p.592.)
Consistent with his psychological evaluations, those who know Mr. Everhart
describe him as a gentle person with no history of violence toward anyone, and certainly
not toward children. Indeed, while his family acknowledges the tragedy of A.C.'s death,
the letters written on his behalf make it clear that whatever happened that night was not
consistent with Mr. Everhart's character. The positive comments in the letters are too
numerous to list in their entirety. Thus, the letters deserve a thorough review. 8
Mr. Everhart lived with his grandparents for most of his childhood and his
grandfather, Pastor John Everhart, wrote that Mr. Everhart was always

a gentle

person

See PSI, pp.241, 242, 245, 247, 602, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635-36, 63839.
8
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and was never violent.

(PSI, p.241.)

Eric

who has known Mr. Everhart since

Mr. Everhart was born, said that Mr. Everhart spent a lot of time with Mr. Lee's children
and nieces and that they liked spending time with him.

(PSI, p.242.)

Mr. Lee

commented that Mr. Everhart was particularly respectful of elderly adults and that, "the
act committed does not represent the true character of this young man." (PSI, p.242.)
Antoine Harrell, a family friend and neighbor, wrote that Mr. Everhart has babysat
Mr. Harrell's three sons and two daughters since they were born.

(PSI, p.245.) He

described Mr. Everhart as "trustworthy, appreciative, and humorous."

(PSI, p.245.)

Hayward Irwin, Mr. Everhart's stepfather, said that Mr. Everhart has always been
tender-hearted.

(PSI, p.247.)

Stacy Everhart, Mr. Everhart's uncle, said that

Mr. Everhart is soft-spoken and would often babysit his cousin and younger brother.
(PSI, p.628.) Chantel Timms, a friend of Mr. Everhart, wrote that Mr. Everhart was very
gentle with her five-week-old son and that he had patience with kids.

(PSI, p.629.)

Erwin Johnson described Mr. Everhart as mellow and laid-back.

(PSI, p.631.)

Mr. Johnson has his own young children and he also witnessed Mr. Everhart interacting
with A.C. (PSI, p.631.) He described the interaction as "loving." (PSI, p.631.) Ana
Kilpatrick, a long-time friend of Mr. Everhart, wrote that Mr. Everhart spent time with her
one-year-old nephew and that he was never aggressive or irritated with the child. (PSI,
p.632.) Dr. Earl Lee, who has known Mr. Everhart since Mr. Everhart was born, said
that he has two daughter (ages five and seven) and that he would not hesitate to leave
them with Mr. Everhart.

(PSI, pp.638-639.)

Ester Huey, the director of Southeast

Yakima Community Center, has known Mr. Everhart his whole life and has never seen
him be violent with anyone at the Center. (PSI, pp.635-636.) Darah Harris wrote that
she knew Mr. Everhart well and that he looked out for her when she was a child and
17

that she knew him to be kind and helpful.

(PSI, p.630.)

De'Etia Parris wrote that

Mr. Everhart was always playful with small children and was never hostile toward them.
(PSI, p.633.)
It is clear from all of these letters that Mr. Everhart is not normally a violent
person.

Idaho courts have recognized that a defendant's good character should

considered at sentencing.

State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404, 411 (1954).

The State

implied, without any evidence or testimony, that there was a pattern of abuse by
Mr. Everhart toward A.C. (Tr. Vol. II., p.1201, Ls.6-9.) All of the witnesses contradicted
this, including A.C.'s mother and grandmother, who testified that they had never seen
Mr. Everhart be abusive toward A.C. (Tr. Vol.I., p.1173, Ls.1

p.1265, Ls.2-12). It

is absurd for the State to suggest that A.C. was repeatedly abused and that her mother
and grandmother, who were constantly bathing her and changing her, did not notice.
The lack of any evidence to show any pattern of abuse further supports that what
happened to A.C. that night was an anomaly.
Consistent with Mr. Everhart's character, Dr. Beaver concluded that Mr. Everhart
was a low risk for violence in the future.

Specifically, Dr. Beaver stated, "I believe

strongly that Jordan Everhart has an excellent prognosis for being be able to become a
contributing member to the community."

(PSI, p.584.)

Dr. Beaver also wrote an

updated report to address the State's concern that Dr. Beaver had not conducted a
HCR-20 evaluation. (PSI, pp. 577-584.) Dr. Beaver explained that this evaluation is not
appropriate for Mr. Everhart because he does not have a major psychiatric illness.
(PSI, p.583.)

However, Dr. Beaver conducted this additional test anyway, and

confirmed that Mr. Everhart was still a low risk to reoffend, even with the additional test.
(PSI, pp.583-584.)

At sentencing, the court stated that it was concerned with
18

Dr. Beaver's conclusion that Mr. Everhart was a low risk to roffend because the current
offense was so serious. (Tr. Vol.II., p.1219, Ls.1-19.) This is an illogical interpretation
of the evaluation. If the nature of the offense automatically categorizes a person as a
high risk to reoffend, then the evaluation becomes irrelevant for people charged with
that offense.

The purpose of these evaluations is to separate the truly violent from

those who make a one-time mistake. Mr. Everhart clearly falls into the latter category.
Twenty years fixed is an excessive sentence for person whose act is clearly
inconsistent with his character. Mr. Everhart has shown a willingness to make positive
changes in his life, such as a desire to obtain his GED and to support his son. (PSI,
p.10.) Further, in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the
Court's decision as to what is an appropriate sentence. Id.

Mr. Everhart clearly has

strong support from his family and his community. There is no reason, based on the
facts and on Mr. Everhart's character and psychological evaluation, to conclude that ten
years in custody would not be sufficient to meet the goals of sentencing.

As such,

Mr. Everhart asserts that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing
an excessive sentence upon him.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Everhart's Rule 35 Motion
For A Reduction Of Sentence
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987)
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and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984 )). "The criteria for examining rulings
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether
the original sentence was reasonable."

Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450). "If the

sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is
excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for
reduction.

Id. (citing State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct App. 1991)).

"When

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
support of the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Mr. Everhart supplied additional information to the district court regarding his
remorse over what happened.

(R., p.400.) In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App.

1991 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, "In light of Alberts'
expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to
accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204.
Specifically, the Rule 35 motion states:
Jordan is extremely remorseful. He is deeply sadden[ed] by the loss of
[AC.] and the pain he caused Kathy Crawford, Sherri Records, [J.C.],
[J.E.], and the rest of the family. Jordan has accepted his fate, but asks
this Court take all of these factors into consideration and grant him
leniency towards the fixed portion of his sentence. 9
(R., p.400.)
Mr. Everhart asserts that in light of the above additional information and the
mitigating factors mentioned in section 11, which need not be repeated, but are
incorporated by reference, the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35
motion.

9

J.C. and J.E. are Ms. Crawford's two minor children.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Everhart respectfully requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and
his case remanded for further proceedings.

Alternatively, Mr. Everhart requests that

this court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 30 th day of May, 2014.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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